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ABSTRACT
THE CURIOUS CASE OF AUSTRIA’S GENEROSITY
Dimitri Niforos, M.A.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2018
Michael Clark, Director
The European Union has seen millions of asylum seekers cross into its borders in the 21st
century. This event has pressed individual EU nations to accept a portion of the arriving asylum
seekers inorder to assist the union in tackling the inflow of seekers. However, each nation’s
generosity towards accepting asylum seekers varies tremendously. This paper will test to see if
nationalist tendencies in the population of a nation have an influence on the nation‘s asylum
seeker generosity in the current migrant crisis (2005-2016). It will then investigate the Czech
Republic that follows the paradigm set forth in this thesis. Finally, it will examine the unique
case of Austria as to why this nation is the biggest outlier in the paradigm set forth.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

What happens when immigration is forced on a nation because the migrant is in urgent
need of relocation? This troubling scenario is the current situation in the European Union which
has seen 3,977,075 asylum seeker applications from the years 2012 to 2016 alone (Eurostat). EU
nations have display reactions ranging from open arms, to mass hysteria of losing sovereignty
over their nation. Explanations for this surge in migration range from escaping poverty, violence,
and poverty resulting in people from around the world seeking refugee and asylum seeker status
to the nations of the EU through the 1949 Refugee Convention (Pictet 1958). The majority
immigrant group entering the EU is the asylum seekers who differ from what most people may
think of as a refugee as the words are mistakenly used interchangeably.1 In the present day, 79%
of asylum seeker applications in the world arrive to the countries of the European Union and
pressure is escalating as asylum seekers risk their lives attempting to cross into the EU. On the
first day of January 2017 there were more than 200 asylum seekers dead from drowning and
hypothermia in the Mediterranean Sea (Dearden 2017). People seeking asylum in Europe is not
something new to the EU. Events like the fall of the iron curtain, the post-World War 2 recovery
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Asylum seekers are defined as someone who says he or she is a refugee, but whose claims have not yet been
definitively evaluated ("What's the Difference between a Refugee and an Asylum Seeker," 2007).
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period, and the breakup of Yugoslavia have brought asylum seekers to Europe before. However,
what makes this event different is the number of applications from people coming outside of the
continent. The question to be answered in this crisis is what factors determine EU nation’s
support in accepting the mass influx of asylum seekers. Professionals in the immigration field
have predicted correctly that asylum seeker applications and arrivals would increase (O'Mahony,
Lorna Fox, and Sweeney 2010; Hatton 2004; 2009). EU nations’ leaders, on the other hand, did
not and the reactions to this recent spike in asylum seekers has caused an increase in support for
alt-right anti-immigrant parties in a number of EU countries. The situation of this mass exodus
into Europe has been dubbed by the media as “The European Migrant Crisis” (Ruz 2015). The
chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel recently spoke at a European Union conference about the
asylum seeker situation commenting that, “If Europe fails on the question of refugees, then it
won't be the Europe we wished for” (“Migrant crisis: Merkel warns of EU ‘failure’” 2015). This
quote illustrates the belief that all EU nations will suffer politically, and as a union, if they do not
resolve this matter. The crisis has intensified for countries in and out of the EU who have
previously worked together. Currently, EU nations are actively constructing border walls or
barriers to pass the inflow of asylum seekers into other countries. The nations who have planned
or built these defenses for the situation at hand are; Austria, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Hungary,
Estonia, Latvia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Spain (African border).
Even though the EU tries to operate as one entity, there’s large variation in states’
generosity toward asylum seekers. What explains this variation in states’ generosity is an
interesting puzzle. This thesis will argue that the dominant economic and cultural paradigm of
viewing state immigration policies fails to explain the variation seen in the EU states’ policies
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over the past decade. In a number of cases, states with similar economic and demographic
profiles, such as Spain and Italy, vary greatly in their generosity toward refugees. The
international and institutional arguments fall short as well, as all countries under examination are
members of the EU and participate in the EU’s common refugee admissions framework that has
taken a backseat to nation’s individual decision-making processes. This thesis will propose
nationalism as an alternative explanatory variable. It tests the utility of the classic division of
states built upon conceptions of “ethnic” vs “civic” nationalism as hypothesized by Kohn’s claim
on nationalism to explain variation in states’ responses to the refugee crisis (1944). It will begin
by testing to see if a general relationship between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ nationalism and asylum
seeker generosity exists. The test will be conducted through a cross-national overview of states’
asylum seeker admissions policies between 2005 and 2016. To conduct a nested analysis the
biggest outlier to this study, Austria, be examined to determine why this “ethnic nationalist” state
does not fit its labeled nationalism. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic, will be examined first to see
how it fits the ethnic nationalist model outstandingly. Because the nations are neighbors, and
both developed this aids with the research by providing a Mill’s Method approach as well.
Even though the EU tries to operate as one entity, there’s large variation in states’
generosity toward asylum seekers. What explains this variation in states’ generosity is an
interesting puzzle. This thesis will argue that the dominant economic and cultural paradigm of
viewing state immigration policies fails to explain the variation seen in the EU states’ policies
over the past decade. In a number of cases, states with similar economic and demographic
profiles, such as Spain and Italy, vary greatly in their generosity toward refugees. The
international and institutional arguments fall short as well, as all countries under examination are
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members of the EU and participate in the EU’s common refugee admissions framework that has
taken a backseat to nation’s individual decision-making processes. This thesis will propose
nationalism as an alternative explanatory variable. It tests the utility of the classic division of
states built upon conceptions of “ethnic” vs “civic” nationalism as hypothesized by Kohn’s claim
on nationalism to explain variation in states’ responses to the refugee crisis (1944). It will begin
by testing to see if a general relationship between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ nationalism and asylum
seeker generosity exists. The test will be conducted through a cross-national overview of states’
asylum seeker admissions policies between 2005 and 2016. To conduct a nested analysis the
biggest outlier to this study, Austria, be examined to determine why this “ethnic nationalist” state
does not fit its labeled nationalism. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic, will be examined first to see
how it fits the ethnic nationalist model outstandingly. Because the nations are neighbors, and
both developed this aids with the research by providing a Mill’s Method approach as well.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on immigration is extensive with multiple disciplines trying to understand a
phenomenon as old as history. From the Gothic refugees pushed into Roman territory due to
Hunnic invasions to the aftermath of the Second World War that left millions without a home.
The approaches on how to tackle immigration stem from the region it is studied. For example,
Morawska (2008) looked at how continents, like North America and Europe, have used their
own approaches to deal with immigration policy. Modern North Americans’ attitudes about
immigration are based around economic fears while Europeans’ express cultural concerns (Sides
and Citrin 2007, 478) (“Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities” 2017).
The argument has a lot to do with North America needing more laborers when viewing people
flowing into their country. Population movements in and out of Europe have been related to
economic, cultural, and international factors such as: the post-World War 2 labor shortage,
European decolonization, and the communist bloc fall, making the study of immigration in
Europe more complex (Pacheco, Rossouw, and Lewer 2013; Jenissen 2006). All the main
schools of thought can be summed up by the four arguments or paradigms discussed in more
depth below: economic arguments, cultural arguments, institutional arguments and international
arguments.
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Economic Paradigm

When studying immigration, authors have utilized economic theories to explain how it
occurs. The push-pull theory details a simple model on how this movement happens. The
concept is demonstrated by; an immigrant leaves their country for certain reasons, ranging from
violence to poverty (push) to countries who have desired things like economic opportunities or
safety from violence (pull). Many researchers use the push-pull theory to explain some part of
the immigration they are trying to understand (Doweschler 2006; Freeman 1995; Tharenou and
Caulfield 2010; Tsoupakis and Tziafetas 1983; Weiner 1992; Pacheco, Rossouw, and Lewer
2013; Neumayer 2005, 391). Capitalism, for instance, has been studied as it relates to
immigration flows and researchers have concluded that capitalist countries perceive immigration
negatively (Dancygier and Donnelly 2012; Loescher 1989; Martin 1991). These authors suggest
that because capitalist markets are always fluctuating, immigrants usually get the blame for
downward movements in the free-market. There is some disagreement however, as Hayter
(2003) believes that capitalism benefits from immigration. Immigrants provide cheap labor that
in turn helps businesses create larger profits. Other authors study the economics of immigration
policy through labor market considerations. Verhaeren (1980), Waldinger (2008), and Neumayer
(2005) uncover many ways that immigrants directly influence the labor market of countries.
They conclude that at certain times immigration has helped a country’s economy, but that if the
country experiences an economic downturn, immigrant populations are the first ones to receive
blame. Neumayer has discussed this in detail and states that asylum seekers in Western Europe
seem to be driven mostly by the economic opportunities presented (Gallagher 2002; 2005).
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When these economic opportunities are lost for the native population for any reason however,
they blame the immigrants and violence may occur towards them. This is often the main reason
why asylum seekers return to their native country (Neumayer 2005, 394).
The economic paradigm can be summed up by economic performance and labor demand
as a key to understanding immigration policy. One-way researchers can capture a nation’s
economic performance is to measure GDP or GDP per capita. A nation’s labor demand can be
captured in a few ways; labor demand, labor mobility, unemployment, etc. A number of EU
cases, however, may not fully support the economic argument in their asylum seeker generosity.
This is due to the increasing numbers of asylum seeker applications accepted even after the Euro
debt crisis took place starting in 2009. Following the economic argument, one would think great
hostility towards immigrants to greatly increase. However, Europe has proved the opposite. For
example, Greece has since struggled with its economy, but has increased its asylum seeker
generosity since the economic downturn. European feelings on employment opportunities in
their nation according to public surveys are one of their biggest fears, further pushing the
economic paradigm in explain the crisis (Eurobarometer).
One might also think that the majority of asylum seekers carry different incentives with
them other than economic opportunities. This however is incorrect to say as EU vice president
Frans Timmermans stated, “More than half of all migrants to Europe are motivated by economic
reasons and are not fleeing war or persecution” (Worley 2016).
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Cultural Paradigm

Cultural identity aspects of immigration have been looked at because there are conflicting
theories on the attitudes people have towards migrants. The major consensus is that incoming
people are perceived negatively around the world (Almond 1992; Karyotis and Patrikios 2010;
Martin 1991; Dancygier and Donnelly 2012; Gallagher 2002). It is even detailed to the account
that 3rd world immigration into European countries has a more profound negative connotation
because of racialization (Garner 2007, 84). Racialization refers to the idea that people have
preconceived negative notions of other races than their own. There is push back, however, as
Freeman (1995) believes states under the principles of classical liberalism do not realize how
open their immigration system is to let in immigrants from around the world.
Even though classical liberalism is an open to interpretation ideology, the push for social
progress stems into allowing immigration without any planned benefit. Rustenbach (2010)
combines cultural identity and economic factors to explain the anti-immigrant feeling, believing
that the two go hand in hand. Sides and Citrin explain the conflict with two concepts; interests
and identities. Interests- ethnic conflict over scarce resources - is what shapes the basis of
opposing immigration. Identities – self-identity from the state overrides any material benefit
received from immigration resulting in the native population to have anti-immigration thoughts,
this being borrowed from social identity theory (2007, 479). Their conclusion is that European
immigration rates are proportionate according to their theory which could hold truth as they
published this many years before the record arrives into the EU. However, the biggest factors
that influences public opinion is a heightened social identity that springs from the overestimation
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of the immigrant population. This can become more profound as asylum seekers are entering at
such an alarming rate that by the year 2050 Europe will be an estimated 25-35% foreign born
(Coleman 2005, 414). A question is left over whether certain identity traits that the literature
outlines as xenophobic, stem from a type of nationalism that is felt by the native population. It is
without a doubt that more native people than not will view immigration negatively at some point,
however what might foster these conditions in 21st century Europe can be further explored. This
research will add to the cultural paradigm in order to understand how nationalism plays a role in
attitudes of immigration.
If negative feelings are the predominant thought in immigration, then understanding why
nations allow it in the first place is worth exploring. Scholars have looked at political philosophy
or what we think of as a general view of something to understand the liberal democratic values
regarding Europe’s immigration attitudes (Janus 2010; Boswell 2000). The claim is that
openness in the acceptance of immigrants could possibly be a result of social desirability
pressures (Janus 2010, 928). The present event is the pouring of people into Europe from the 3rd
world at such a rate that assimilation is not keeping up with it. The reason for the event occurring
is in part because European nations have guilt from the evils done to the 3rd world populations
from the colonial period (Habermas 1994, 107). These concepts provide the reasoning to why
immigration is allowed in the first place which then lends itself to the majority view that
immigrants are viewed negatively once they arrive.
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International Paradigm

Other authors study the historical perceptive of migration (Bertossi and Milkop 2008;
Hatton 2004; Vedder 2000; Meyerstein 2005). These authors examine trends in immigration
flows during the 20th and 21st centuries to lend insight into how the movement of immigration
may look in the near future. They believe mass exodus events, such as the Syrian civil war
causing 5.4 million people to seek asylum, are currently the biggest factors in driving
international immigration ("Syria Emergency"). This may seem like the case in this research
also, however in the biggest asylum seeker year of 2015, only 20% of the asylum seekers were
from Syria. Even though international events do play a role, the numbers and generosity are too
high for immigration to be simply explained by an event such as the war in Syria.

The Movement of Asylum Seekers as a Major Effect on the European Union

As pointed out by Bertossi, Milkop, Hatton, Vedder, and Meyerstein, the movement of
these asylum seekers is vital to understanding a piece of the immigration policy question. The
EU possesses one unique feature to this movement concept that may affect the any selected case.
The Schengen Agreement signed in 1985 was an agreement to abolish national border checks
from nation to nation in the EU. Because of this, EU border nations will be influenced by the
Dublin regulations. Nations within the agreement may also suffer as asylum seekers make their
way to popular destinations such as Germany who accept the largest amount of applications a
year. The main migration flow that pours into Western Europe enters from Italy and Spain, while
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the major route into Central Europe enters through the Balkans from Turkey. Because Germany
accepts a massive amount of asylum seeker applications in the EU, nations between Germany
and the Balkans such as Austria may be affected as it is falls within a major route. Although, it
would be hard to draw the conclusion that many asylum seekers try to gain asylum in nations in
between their entry point and destination because of fatigue being suffered enroute. This
conclusion is drawn from the idea that Germany will offer these asylum seekers a better chance
of asylum being granted.2 However, in the case that this fatigue does occur, and nations such as
Austria accept those applications, this would be exposed in the nation’s applications rate rising
while the granting of asylum stays constant. For example, Eurostat shows that Austria has
accepted around the same number of applications every year other than the years 2015 and 2016
where a spike in applications did occur because of the record number asylum seekers entering
into the EU. If the movement problem does exist, it would have occurred in only the later years
of the observation.
Institutions Paradigm

The chief institution in Europe is the European Union. This institution was created
officially in 1957 with six founding nations. The EU is a major factor in the framework of
immigration policy (Freeman 1995; Garner 2007; Wolf 1996; Facchini 2006). Meyerstein and
others believe that the institution in itself is the problem of immigration in Europe because they
unite the 28 nations by implementing harmonization of laws. For example, the Schengen

Germany granted asylum to 695,608 applications (51% acceptance rate) compared to Austria’s rate of 89,955
(43% acceptance rate).
2
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Agreement that works as an open border policy to which immigration can run amuck (2005;
Gallagher 2002; Almond 1992, 60-61). These researchers conclude that if the EU did not involve
itself at all with individual nation’s immigration policy, immigration would not be at the current
situation. However, it is difficult to imagine the EU not wanting and needing to be involved in
the current migrant crisis. The institution of the EU though has not been as effective as one
would hope. A recent case study on Italian immigration policy showed EU meddling in Italian
immigration policy caused Italians to question their European identity (compared to their Italian
identity) which in turn led to more negative thoughts on immigration (Magnani 2012).

Asylum Seekers

After covering the concept of immigration, there is a need to understand the application
process for asylum seekers entering Europe. Asylum seekers can be from any part of the world,
however, not all asylum seekers are treated similarly. Lutz and Prinz (1992) have argued that
Europeans view asylum seekers from other European countries more favorably than those from
outside the continent. Authors have added to this by looking at the housing crisis that occurs
when asylum seekers try to assimilate to their new country’s neighborhoods (O'Mahony, Fox,
and Sweeney 2010; Lubbers, Coenders, and Scheepers 2006). Places like the Netherlands had
thousands of asylum seeker centers opened up in the 1990’s. This caused Dutch natives’ housing
values to drop and by 2003 more centers were closing than opening (Lubbers, Coenders, and
Scheepers 2006). The disconnect between asylum seekers and their host nation can be seen
before they arrive. A case study on Belgium by Bloommaert displayed the asymmetry
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immigration officers have towards asylum seekers (2001). Immigration officers have no way of
testing the claims made by asylum seekers and rely merely on writing styles to determine
decisions on applications resulting in the asymmetry.
In recent years, the number of asylum seekers entering Europe has been so dramatic that
it is being called a “crisis”. This word has been used by others in the past. Scholars such as
Loescher (1989) and Weiner (1992) successfully predicted that the number of people seeking
asylum would dramatically increase in the 21st century. More contemporary work by O'Mahony,
Lorna Fox, and Sweeney (2010), and also Hatton (2004; 2009) speak to how and why large
volumes of asylum seekers are arriving and the policy implications of these flows. The overall
contention is that Europe failed to consider solutions to immigration decades ago, when
immigration was just starting to become a problem. Now that it is a crisis, there is a rush to find a
solution that should have had implemented long ago. The concept of calling the immigration
problem a crisis is best viewed when taking the international approach. Researcher Boswell
states that old methods of handling immigration in Europe have minimal effectiveness in the
current situation. EU countries currently hold two new approaches to handling this wave of
asylum seekers. These two approaches are categorized as externalization and preventive.
Externalization is the system of strengthening “old tools” as illustrated by tightening borders,
stricter immigration laws, etc, while preventive measures are “new tools” e.g. when a country
opens diplomatic connections with the nation sending asylum seekers to come to a compromise
that pleases both nations (2003, 619-627). In the early 2000’s we have seen EU nations deploy
the “old tool” approach in order to combat asylum seeker immigration. However, this seems to
not be the most proactive approach as the researcher believes cooperation between sending and
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receiving nations is a requirement to solving the crisis (Boswell 2003). The take away from the
asylum seeker literature is that mass numbers lead to a more complicated situation in affected
countries. All but one nation in the EU are suffering from lag in applications processing with half
having 20% of more of their accepted applications to decide on (Eurostat). One would imagine
the slowing of accepting applications in the future to catch up with their processing of them.
However, the asylum seeker acceptance numbers have only dropped in the last year of the time
period examined by this study, making the understanding of a purposed threshold in it beginning
stages.
The biggest limitation to studying asylum seekers is that they are not studied as often as
refugees because of the greater difficulties in accessing data/ interviews (Ryan, Kelly, and Kelly
2009). This lack of knowledge is seen in every phase of society, including the medical field
where asylum seekers are treated the worst when it comes to health treatment and coverage
(Ryan, Kelly, and Kelly 2009).

CHAPTER 3
THE EUROPEAN UNION, ASYLUM SEEKERS, AND HOW NATIONS WORK
WITHIN IT

The institution of the European Union is deeply involved with the asylum seeker crisis
and has set the framework for how to handle asylum seekers entering their borders. To
understand the inner workings of the EU, the European Parliamentary Research Service has
summarized what the EU has done in the current migrant crisis. We begin with the start of the
immigration policy implemented by the last updates of the EU Common European Asylum
System (CEAS) that was completed in 2005. The CEAS is intended to ensure that all EU member
states have a fair and mininum standard when processing asylum seeker applications. The CEAS
has also provided the European Refugee Fund as well as promoting unity between EU states in
dealing with the asylum seeker flow and making sure every EU state contributes their fair share
to the crisis. The completion date 2005 is selected rather than the year 1999 because that was the
year in which the CEAS was fully established putting all nations officially in the legislative
framework ("Common European Asylum System." 2018). The framework of the CEAS which as
of recent has included asylum seeker quotas. However, it has been noted that multiple nations in
the EU follow these quotas in varies degrees and decide their participation at which they allow
asylum seekers into their nation (“Understanding Migration and Asylum in the European Union”

16

2016). An important point to note - this research will only consider the asylum seeker orbit
problem occurring in the case study portion. This orbiting refers to EU states pushing accepted
undecided asylum seekers from nation to nation while not deciding their application status until
their location situation is resolved. Taking the orbit problem into consideration will
disproportionally increase the number of asylum seekers that are present in the EU. This occurs
because EU members sometimes dump asylum seekers they have already processed to other
nations for them to deal with. As one can imagine applications get tossed and the process causes
confusion and asylum seeker applications therefore rise. The dependent variable of first time
applications accepted will prevent this orbit problem from occurring in this research. Also, the
EU has combated these practices by stating that an asylum seeker can only apply for asylum to
one nation in the EU. For example, if an asylum seeker applies in Germany he/she cannot go
anywhere else and if Germany rejects them then every EU nation also rejects any future
application.
The EU has also established the Dublin system that states, “The first Member State an
asylum-seeker enters is responsible for examining his or her application for international
protection.” Even though this holds true it refers to where the asylum seeker is processed rather
than where they first set foot in the EU. For example, where the asylum seeker is finger-printed
would be considered their point of entry. This makes the Dublin system an a la carte system for
EU nations to select how many asylum seekers they are willing to relocate into their nation, and
which they can then accept or reject in terms of applications. Overall, the EU’s, at best, loose
guidelines help this analysis because other than increases in applications for border nations of the
EU, a nation can assess their immigration policy accordingly to allow a certain amount of asylum
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seeker applications. This, in turn, is considered their part in helping the EU with the asylum
seeker crisis.
The EU has spent billions of dollars helping border nations control the inflow of
immigration, moving them deeper into Europe, and returning rejected applicants to their native
nations. Future proposals to help control asylum seekers into the EU include a centralized EU
agency that will install collective responsibility to all EU nations. Other future proposals fall on
the same line of trying to make the asylum seeker distribution an equal effort by all nations.
There is also push-back on the other side of this, as EU politicians have looked to stop the
Dublin regulations of making the first nation an asylum seeker enters the nation that must handle
their application and protection. The latter proposes an “everyone for themselves“ mentality.

CHAPTER 4
REFINING NATIONALISM TO APPLY IN THIS RESEARCH

Nationalism

Nationalism is an ever-evolving concept that has its roots in understanding identity. The
three major approaches to the study of identity that lead to state formation are: primordial,
instrumentalist/situationalist, and constructivist. The primordialist view of identity sees identity
springing from ethnicity, irrationality, given not chosen, not malleable, and believes it is timeless
and part of human nature (Geertz, 1963). For example, Greeks are Greeks because they have a
perceived “Greek blood”. The determination of possessing Greek blood could be seen from the
Greek independence movement that claimed language, history, etc. as features to create an
identity. Smith expands the primordial approach by stating that it can evolve (1991, 25). To
continue the example, we see Greek identity start in antiquity with Greek Paganism and in time
transform into Greek Orthodox. Researcher Kaufman believes the strength of primordialism is its
understanding of how ethnic conflict occurs and to what intensity (2005).3
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This hold truer when no other variables are inflicting it. For example, ethnic violence with no material benefit from
it at all.
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The instrumentalist/situationalist identity employs rational choice theory. Those ascribing
to this view believe people come together to obtain something they could not obtain individually,
and this is how identity is formed (Bates 1983). The approach has been updated to stress that the
actor deciding on their identity is limited to what identity they can form depending on
institutional rules they are subjected too (Posner 2005). Instrumentalist can best explain cases in
which the ethnic environment changes giving people a decision on who they are or want to
become. It explains the cases that primordialism has difficulties with, as for example colonized
nations, but instrumentalism suffers from issues of understand ethnic violence as it assumes it
must be because of a material benefit that does not hold true in many cases (Kaufman 2005,
187).
Lastly, constructivists expand on the instrumentalist approach by adding historical
institutionalism. Constructivists argue that political elites create the state. Fearon and Laitin take
the constructivist approach in explaining conflicts in Sir Lanka and Northern Ireland that the
Primordialist approach could not explain (2000). A consensus reach by many constructivists is
that the print press, invention of capitalism, and modernity in general gave means to the elite and
people to create the state (Anderson 2006) (Gellner 2006). Anderson creates an explation for
nationalism through the constructivist approach. He believes once political actors achieve
modernity (a socio-economic level e.g. print press) they will craft a border to nestle in their new
nation which the people within will become its populous. This crafting that occurs sets the
prerequisites for being a member of the nation. Certain features like; language, geographic
location, etc. Can be used in order to assess this. No matter how big or small the nation, the
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communication of a national language and events being reported (by paper or radio) cause the
people within this border have a shared identity. The identity quickly then transforms into what
Anderson perceives as a community. This community, even though sharing a common culture,
will have most of its population unaware of each other (Anderson 2006).
With identity covered, nationalism can be further extrapolated. Depending on what
approach one takes on identity decides how one views the concept of nationalism. Nationalism
can be simply defined as one’s allegiance to a nation. Constructivists such as Anderson believe
in the concept of imagined community as just explained (1983). In this example the state comes
first, and a nation is created because of it ‘state-nation’. Primordialists such as Marx believe that
the nation comes first because the populist has a shared identity from cultural markers which in
turn causes them to want a state ‘nation-state’. They create the state from their nation by using
inclusion and exclusion mechanisms. These mechanisms can be thought of as ‘requirements’ to
be part of the state e.g. believing in the dominant religion of the region or you cannot be a part of
our state (2002). Other thoughts on state creation taking a moderate approach, emphasizes the
idea of a unitary state that posits as a nation with its history, religion and shared language and
can be explained by either the “nation-state” or “state-nation” models (Stepan et al. 2011). A
way to think of nation building is to ask if the population in the 13 colonies were American, or
subjects of the British Empire, before they gained their independence. Is identity inherent and
therefore a state is inevitable? Or do people get together and simply want more material benefit
to which they create a state and find an identity later? This is still a debate worth having on
nationalism.
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Kohn is considered one of the fathers of nationalism in the English-speaking world
(Larsen 2016). He sets up the dichotomy still used to this day of civic and ethnic nationalism. He
argues that there were two formations of nationalism in Europe that took place, the civic one
which entailed how Western Europe formed under liberal values to create a political community
where concepts like respect of a nations constitution is more valued than cultural tradition, while
the latter, ethnic, relates to a non-western European style found in Central and Eastern Europe
that values a cultural community. The cultural community encompasses cultural markers such as
language, religion, traditions, etc. these values tend to lead to exclusion of minorities who do not
fit the cultural community and the rise of authoritarianism usually occurs (Kohn 1944). Kohn’s
approach to his civic and ethnic states can be seen using the primordialism, constructivist, and
instrumentalist approaches on identity and nationalism. Even though Kohn’s dichotomy is
approaching its 75th birthday, modern day researchers have found use for this western/nonwestern dichotomy when it is modified to explain modern nationalist thought (Jaskulowski 2010,
299). Kohn’s dichotomy on nationalism will be the framework in which this research will use
nationalism. Other research will be included to update this civic/ethnic nationalism to see how it
may impact immigration policy and in turn give new insight into what is occurring in the EU
asylum seeker crisis.
The dichotomy is further expanded by Brubaker who looks at the comparative cases of
France and Germany to find whether civic or ethnic nationalism is present (2005). He found that
France is civic because of its formation as a state-nation and values built on civil service rather
than blood, culture, etc. while Germany is an ethnic state due to its nation-state creation that
favors the Volksgeist or what we would think of as historical roots. There is major push back to
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this simplification of nationalism as Shulman demonstrates in claiming that the ethnic/civic
dichotomy is not as applicable in modern day Europe (2002). What can be considered the middle
ground is that nationalism can still be seen as civic/ethnic but these are not fixed to the nation
forever. This means that through time a nation can switch from one side to the other. A nation
can possibly have a population that mixes the ethnic and civic view of their nationalism (A. D.
Smith 2000). This is displayed in Larsen’s work that notes this change with the nation of
Germany that formed as an ethnic state but in modern times has altered into a moderate civic
style nationalism while keeping some ethnic views in place (2016, 3-4). To make this perhaps
simpler, we can think of nationalism emerging in one of two ways; civic-more politically
inclined, ethnic-more culturally inclined as displayed in a quote from Anthony Smith “… every
nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms.
Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and
vernacular components that are emphasized” (Smith 1991, 13). With civic and ethnic nationalism
being established as not fixed, this study will take into account an EU nation’s nationalist
tendency decades before the first year of analysis 2005.
Having defined nationalism we turn to characteristics of nationalism that relate to the
study of immigration. The case of Estonia helps explain ethnic nationalism over time. The case
shows the same nominal variables used from past case-studies of ethnic nationalism can still help
account for the present cases of ethnic nationalism showing that the concept of it has not altered
(Abdelal 2009, 53-54). Researcher Conner tackles the concept of ethnic nationalism to redefine
how we use the principle of self-determination and the identity of a group of people being
beyond the term ‘nation.’ This ethno political consciousness for the state is believed to be
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triggered by a natural feeling of xenophobia (1973, 1-7) (Weiss 2003, 378). Gans redefined selfdetermination decades later by stating the two arguments of liberal nationalism; freedom-based
and identity-based. For this research there is a focus on Gans’ examination of the third principle
that states that nations have an obligation to accept refugees and how nationalist immigration
policies should reflect this. It seems that a nation would benefit from taking refugees as a priority
into their nation because it progresses the self-determination the people have in their allegiance
or identity to their state. However, this self-determination only functions when the refugee is that
of the same culture as the nation they are trying to migrate to (1998, 175-175). Overall, the main
conclusion is that a nation with any form of nationalism will always benefit by favoring people
who are of the same culture.4 This xenophobia is expandable as ethnic nations use
communication platforms like media as a tool for promoting their preferred type of society. For
example, the Czech Republic’s Prime Minister Andrej Babiš can credit his position in part that
he owns a media empire in the nation to which he could present his message out in his
perspective to the public (Associated Press and Reuters 2017). Because mass media can reach
the vast majority of a nation’s population it is arguably a necessity to win public office.
However, the caveat is that there is a overexaggerating that every ethnic nation will use violent
rhetoric in media to gain support (Corcoran 2011).
Nationalist tendencies cannot be considered as fixed and always need to be interpreted in
the context of the times at which they are being studied. Ethnic nations should possess a less
generous asylum seeker application rate because they negatively perceive foreigners who are not
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Example, the call for Jews to return to Israel after the year 1948 as the self determination of the people to
strengthen the state of Israel that is the new nation of the Jewish people.
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of the same ethnicity. This can stem from multiple reasons such as an exclusionary
culture, perceived threats on the nation’s culture, etc. However, as pointed out, a nation can
experience shifting attitudes to a more civic form of nationalism – one that leans towards ideas
of: liberal democratic values, pressures from local society to be more accepting, and or colonial
guilt (if applicable) which lead to asylum seeker generosity (Janus 2010; Boswell 2000;
Habermas 1994). This newly applied nationalist metric should help refine the cultural and
economic paradigms currently employed by displaying a better predictive power regarding the
generosity of EU nations.

Illustrative Examples of Ethnic Nationalism on the Rise

The case study examination of Greece is interesting because it is the first EU nation to
have a major asylum seeker route pass through it (Karvotis and Patrikios2010; Tsoupakis and
Tziafetas 1983). The Greek public has been shown to have one of the most negative opinions on
asylum seekers (Sides and Citrin 2007, 484). The reason for this widespread negative attitude is
that the population comes in direct contact with more asylum seekers then they processed
because they transport them deeper into Europe. In the entirely of the crisis, Greece has only
accepted 193,370 applications and granted asylum to 10,300 of those applications (Eurostat).
However, Greece has experienced millions more who have crossed it giving it a unique
characteristic of experiencing more asylum seekers than they could handle compared to other EU
nations who did not. To counter balance this, the research also includes a case study of Sweden
which is the most generous nation in the EU towards asylum seekers. Sweden has tried cultural
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assimilation plans that have met with mediocre success. However, Sweden’s alt-right antiimmigration Sweden Democrats is gaining support showing that even in the most tolerant of
nations there’s trouble related to the asylum seeker crisis (Yngvesson 2012). The Sweden
Democrats was founded in 1988 but did not win a single seat in the Riksdag until 2010.5 In the
recent 2014 election the party saw an increase to 49/349 seats in the Riksdag making it the third
largest party in Sweden. The party runs on the plate forms of open racisism, anti-immigrant, and
right-wing populism and has been referred to as a “single-issue-party” because of their strict
stance on immigration (Erlingsson, Vernby, and Öhrvall 2012). There rise can be directly related
to the asylum seekers crisis as public opinion polls show that being the reason why the
population voted for them ("Far-right Sweden Democrats Neck-and-neck in Poll with 2nd Most
Popular Party," 2016).

5

Riksdag is the Swedish parliament.

CHAPTER 5
HYPOTHESIS

The hypothesis being put forth, H1, is that ethnically labeled nations will be less generous
with their asylum seeker application rates as compared to civic nations. This helps to explain the
shortcomings of the other main approaches. If a nation is labelled as ethnic nationalist however
displays a generosity such as that of a civic nationalist nation, there are a few explanations put
forth. The three possible explanations at work in the case of an outlier are H2a, the case of the
outlier nation being affected by the movement of asylum seekers entering deep into European
territory. H2b, the outlier nation appealing to the EU’s standard of accepting as many asylum
seekers as possible in order to help the EU immigration situation. H2c, a loose immigration
policy that needs revising has caused unexpectedly large numbers of immigrants. The leading
explanation here is that all three factors may play a role. However, the predominant thinking is
that the outlier nation is trying to make good favor with the EU. The EU has addressed the crisis
by establishing quotas for each nation to follow. This could stem from the population’s or the
ruling government’s approval of the EU which will be explored in the case study. The last
hypothesis made is if the ruling government of outlier nation favor’s the EU, but the population
disapproves. H3, the outlier nation’s anti-immigrant party, should rise in popularity as the nation
keeps accepting a substantial amount of asylum seeker applications.

CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH DESIGN

What this research is trying to achieve is the measure of nationalist tendency in each EU
nations and if their asylum seeker generosity correlates with that measure. If an ethnic nationalist
nation displays generosity above what is predicted, then a case study of that nation will be
conducted. A nested analysis complied later with a mill’s method approach will be used to test
the outlier case with that of a case that fits the model.
To begin, we start by outlining the nations that qualify to be examined sufficiently for
their asylum seeker generosity. All EU nations other than Croatia are selected. The time series of
this analysis is then established starting from the completion of the CEAS in 2005 to the present
day in 2016. Each nation will then be put in tables that list the nation’s name, followed by their
dependent variable in a ratio form. Because the dependent variable is (asylum seeker generosity)
that requires three measures to capture. For this reason, three tables will be displayed with each
metric.6 Each table will show the nation’s name color coded according to their nationalist
tendency. The key explanatory variable is (ethnic nationalism) that showed display nations who
possess this ethnic tendency to report lower scores on their asylum seeker generosity variable.
An observation will be made to see if the nationalist tendencies fit their expected placement. Any
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Three metrics: accepted applications, rate of completion, asylum granted.
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ethnic nationalist nations that are observed to be outliers will then be singled out for further
examination.
Each nation with its same asylum seeker generosity score and nationalist tendency will
then be input in figures to control for the economic paradigm and cultural paradigm. This is
conducted to see if other paradigm may be able to help explain or interpret the gaps of outlier
nations. The hope is that the national tendency will contribute to the cultural paradigm and
correlate with the economic paradigm.
Once the paradigms are accounted for, we turn attention back to any ethnic nationalist
outlier cases that do not fit the new nationalist paradigm created. We test to see if the any
obvious explanations are to blame such as the Dublin regulations that fit in the international
paradigm. The case that is the most difficult to be explained by any of the paradigms will then be
chosen for the case study. Before the case study, a comparison will be made with the selected
nation to a nation who is also an ethnic nationalist state as well and is somewhat relatable to the
case study nation in the realm of, economic development, population demographics, and geopolitical location. A section will also be provided to explain the metrics used to calculate how
much more generous the case study nation is compared to how it theoretically it should be.
After the comparison is made, the case-study will involve process tracing the events that
caused Austria to be suprisingly generous. This process tracing will also evaluate the validity of
the three possible hypotheses set forth. The case study will first view the history of Austria’s
immigration. This will set up the framework in which Austria will enter the aslyum seeker crisis.
It will then be followed by viewing how the newly elected from 2006-2017 coilition parties of
OVP and SPO government handled immigration. With these parties in control for the majority of
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the crisis, we can see if they relaxed or tightened the asylum seeker laws of Austria set in the
1990’s (H2c)(H2b).Also, A review on the transfer of asylum seekers from the neighboring
nations of Hungury, Slovenia, and Greece. Austria was asked to help in the transportion or
processing of additional asylum seekers from these nations which resulted in the construction of
a border barrier (H2a). Lastly, a review on Austria’s policy on their own states to take in a
calculated amount of asylum seekers. What is looking to be uncovered is that the states who took
in less than their requirement voted in a larger quantity for the Freedom Party because of
unwanted exposure to asylum seekers (H3).

CHAPTER 7
MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES

Number of Cases and Time Series

A few descriptive statistics were employed in order to isolate the country for selection.
Every country that is part of the EU will be included in the sample other than Croatia. Croatia
only recently joined the EU in 2013 and its three years of asylum seeker application acceptance
is less than the average. The countries of Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007 meaning
they were not members for the 2005 and 2006 years of examination but did keep records of
asylum seekers application rates so they will be included. The 27 countries will be examined
from the start of the EU Common European Asylum System in 2005 until the present release of
the 2016 asylum seeker application rate report from Eurostat. This gives 27 cases over 11 years
creating 297 observations.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is defined as a nation’s (asylum seeker generosity). The way
generosity is measured is by the number of first time asylum seeker applications that the EU
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nation decides to review in a given year. This is not to be confused with the number of asylum
seekers who simply applied to that EU nation. The major limitation with this variable is that the
inflows of asylum seekers into the EU can dramatically change within a year causing EU
countries to increase their application rates to help support other EU nations combat the asylum
seeker inflows. The counter balance to this is that all EU nations decide how much they want to
help and have their own methods of calculating how many they will be willing to accept. To
complement the measure of asylum seeker generosity, the statistic of how many of the actual
applications they accept to review, and that result in a person being granted a form of asylum
will also be used. One might ask why then not solely look at only the asylum seekers that were
granted asylum? This, however, is a pragmatic choice because application decisions in some
cases take years causing a lag that can confuse and disorganize the method used in selecting the
case study nation. While on the other hand, acceptance to review applications is decided in a
given calendar year making it less challenging for comparison with the flow of asylum seekers.
Selecting the first-time application acceptance rate as a starting point also brushes aside any
concerns over the relocation of asylum seekers that the EU conducts. The EU relocations may
cause a nation to take in and harbor asylum seekers who enter what is known as the term asylum
seeker in orbit.

Primary Explanatory Variable

The key independent variable is (nationalist tendency) and that ethnic nationalist nations
will have lower asylum seeker acceptance rates than in civic nationalist countries. As explained,
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ethnic nationalism will take Kohn’s ethnic vs. civic dichotomy to determine how a nation should
be classified. To account for the pitfalls of determining nationalism we will define nationalism
by how the people feel about their nationhood in the present. To interview a whole nation’s
population though is impractical. The data on nationalist tendency is taken from Larsen’s
research that mainly used national identity measures from the International Social Survey
Programme (ISSP) data. The ISSP data provides 88 national samples including in all 104,605
respondents and has only collected their responses from people whose parents were both born in
the country giving this a completely native focus. Seven questions were asked to be graded by
importance in determining the nation’s nationalism. The seven questions are as listed: To be born
in the nation, to have citizenship in the nation, to have lived in the nation for most of one’s life,
to speak the native language, to be of the dominant religion, to respect political institutions and
laws, and to feel the country’s nationality. They can be answered using the following categories
“very important”, “fairly important”, “not very important”, “not important at all” and “can’t
choose”. The EU nations can be ranked in one of four categories to which the prevalence of one
of four types of nationalism is determined by two paradigms, importance of national political
community and importance of national cultural community.” This correlated with the nationalist
belief that lends itself to how people perceive their state as discussed in the nationalism section
of the literature review.

CHAPTER 8
CASE SELECTION METHOD AND JUSTIFICATION

We will test to see if civic nations on average are more generous of asylum seekers than
that of ethnic-nationalist nations. If this hypothesis is supported, then any case that does not fit
the newly established immigration norm will be further explained. The nation to be selected will
be the most generous ethnic nation that cannot be easily ruled out by one of the paradigms.
With some insight we must distinguish the nations in terms of our key independent
variable to see which are civic and which are ethnic. We borrow Christian Albrekt Larsen’s
study on comparing the nationalism of 44 countries to see this ethnic vs. civic rivalry at work.
Larsen notes that some nations do not fall within the civic/ethnic dichotomy and has added two
other classification to explain nations that differ. The majority of EU nations however fall within
the civic/ethnic nationalist category. The four distinct categories are: “Republican” (civic),
“National liberalist” (possess both civic and ethnic traits), “De-constructionist” (neither), and
“National conservatist” (ethnic). These results stem from where the nation stood in the year
2013.7 The data is updated every 10 years and a consideration at where nations were in 2003 is
also considered. As mentioned, the civic vs. ethnic dichotomy is fluid as feelings of identity take
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2013 represents a good year in observation because it is a year before the record rise in migration into the EU
that surely swayed public opinion.
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different forms in the population throughout time. The only nation, however, to switch between
the civic/ethnic dichotomy is that of Estonia which was in the ethnic category but has since
changed to the civic. The majority of the few nations who have changed went from Deconstructionist to National conservatist. Examples include the UK and Slovak Republic.
However, our main focus is on the civic and ethnic categories as the other two are not very
telling. De-constructionist carry low importance in the cultural and political community of the
state. With low cultural importance it would be difficult to find native culture being threaten and
causing conflict with foreign asylum seekers. To add, low importance on political community
means liberal democratic values like contributing help to the EU asylum seeker crisis does not
seem apparent either. As for National liberalist, they possess a high sense of both cultural and
political community. This can cause the nation to go either way in sense of asylum seeker
generosity and therefore becomes more influenced by the economic, international, and
institutional paradigm.
Table 1
The explanations on different forms of nationalist tendency.
Source: Nationalism in Contemporary Nation States Imagined Political and Cultural Community
across 44 countries/Christian Albrekt Larsen 2016.
Republican
National liberalist
De-constructionist
National
conservatist

Carries civic traits that favor generosity
Carries both civic and ethnic traits that can either favor or not favor
generosity
Carries neither ethnic and civic traits that can either favor or not favor
generosity
Carries ethnic traits that do not favor generosity
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Larsen’s results will be shown with the corresponding colors above and each nation will
be ranked in order of applications accepted and granted asylum per 100,000 people averaged
over the years 2005-2016. Nations that appear in black ink were not included in the study.
However, many of these nations are small in their population size, economy, and are border
nations that are likely to suffer from the asylum seeker movement problem, meaning they can be
explained quite easily by the international and/or institutional paradigm if they were either ethnic
or civic.
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Table 2
Ranking of EU nations by asylum seeker applications and labeled by nationalism tendency.
Source: Nationalism in Contemporary Nation States Imagined Political and Cultural
Community across 44 countries/Christian Albrekt Larsen 2016. EuroStat, math done by author.

Nation Name

Sweden
Malta
Cyprus
Austria
Hungary
Luxembourg
Belgium
Germany
Greece
Denmark
Finland
Netherlands
France
Bulgaria
Italy
Ireland
UK
Slovenia
Poland
Slovakia
Czech Rep
Spain
Lithuania
Latvia
Romania
Estonia
Portugal

Applications Accepted Average over 100,000 People

495.6/100,000
459.5/100,000
307.8/100,000
292.7/100,000
241/100,000
237.6/100,000
198.9/100,000
192.7/100,000
143.9/100,000
113.9/100,000
107.6/100,000
106.2/100,000
87.5/100,000
73/100,000
62.6/100,000
56.3/100,000
28/100,000
23.8/100,000
23.3/100,000
21.2/100,000
14.2/100,000
13.3/100,000
12.3 /100,000
8.1/100,000
6.2/100,000
5.8/100,000
3.8/100,000
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Table 3
Ranking of EU nations by asylum seekers granted asylum and labeled by nationalism tendency.
Source: Nationalism in Contemporary Nation States Imagined Political and Cultural
Community across 44 countries/Christian Albrekt Larsen 2016. EuroStat, math done by author.

Nation Name

Malta
Sweden
Austria
Germany
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Belgium
Denmark
Cyprus
Finland
Italy
Bulgaria
France
U.K.
Greece
Ireland
Poland
Hungary
Czech Rep
Spain
Lithuania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Estonia
Romania
Latvia
Portugal

Asylum Granted Average over 100,000 People

243.1/100,000
214.5/100,000
89.2/100,000
71.7/100,000
54.8/100,000
53.7/100,000
53.2/100,000
48.6/100,000
47.8/100,000
30.3/100,000
23.6/100,000
20.5/100,000
14.6/100,000
12.8/100,000
7.7/100,000
5.8/100,000
3.7/100,000
3.3/100,000
3/100,000
2.4/100,000
2.3/100,000
2/100,000
1.9/100,000
1.9/100,000
1.6/100,000
1.2/100,000
.9/100,000
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The list shows a clear connection in both tables between civic nations being more
generous towards asylum seekers than ethnic ones. A lot of the unidentified cases, even though
high on the list, can be ignored as Malta, Cyprus, and Luxembourg are small states with
developed economies that can explain away part of their generosity. For example, Cyprus, Malta,
and Luxembourg have a combined population of two million people and their combined GDP
per capita would be $45,100. Also notable is that Malta and Cyprus are island nations that are
very close to asylum seeker-sending nations, meaning they mostly suffer from the movement of
these asylum seekers because of the Dublin regulations. In sum, the nationalist variable shows
that it can further the understanding of asylum seeker generosity in the EU. To account for
nations who are systematically accepting a lot of applications but not granting asylum we see the
processing rates of each nation. A nation might try to show their contribution to the crisis by
harboring asylum seekers with accepting their application but then rejecting the majority of them
or not processing them so to later push them off to another nation.
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Table 4
Ranking of EU nations by completion rate of their accepted applications.
Source: EuroStat, math done by author.
Nation Name

Czech Rep
Netherlands
France
Ireland
Malta
UK
Slovakia
Cyprus
Italy
Sweden
Austria
Belgium
Luxembourg
Slovenia
Estonia
Romania
Greece
Finland
Germany
Denmark
Spain
Portugal
Poland
Lithuania
Latvia
Bulgaria
Hungary

Asylum Application Processed Rate

99.90%
97%
94%
94%
91%
90%
88%
86%
83%
83%
82%
81%
80%
79%
77%
76%
75%
74%
73%
72%
70%
Significant drop of 18%
52%
51%
51%
49%
38%
11%
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The table shows significant variation across the board. The biggest gap occurs after
Spain’s 70% process rate to Portugal’s 52%. The decision is made to assume to a degree that
nations who are 52% or below their processing rate are in some way appealing to the EU by
accepting applications that they do not have the resources to manage or do not plan to grant
asylum. Also, worth pointing out is that no civic nation is below the 70% threshold while two
ethnic nations (Bulgaria and Hungary) are very low even though they possessed what looked like
a generous rate of application acceptance and/or granting asylum. To address why the majority
of nations fall between the 70%-90% mark, we see that the past two years have seen 2,583,735
applications being received in Europe which exceeds the amount of applications received
through the years 2008-2014 combined. Most EU nations have had to take in a larger sum of
applications due to this and this results in a lag in their processing rate. As for the nations below
the 52% mark we see a slightly different story. Hungary in the year 2015 took in 177,135
applications, which is more than all other years since 2005 combined. In that shocking year
Hungary only reviewed 3,340 of those applications (less than 2%). To say that Hungary will ever
catch up to the massive collection of applications in 2015 alone is a stretch as 2016 saw Hungary
accept 29,430 applications and only reviewed 5,105.
To further examine the relationship between nationalism and immigration policy in the
figures provided. Two variables will be examined that best determine what researchers argue are
big influences: economy and society/culture (Morawska 2008; Dancygier and Donnelly 2012;
Loescher 1989; Martin 1991). From here the non-identified nations will be excluded. The four
figures display the averages of asylum seeker generosity from the years 2005-2016. They are
also color coded according to national ideology as listed in the corner right of the figure. The
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first two figures will run GDP per capita averaged over a country’s generosity by accepted
applications (figure 1) and the other compared a nation’s non-native population taking the
average from the median years of 2010-2011 and a country’s generosity by accepted applications
(figure 2). The other two figures will be ran by the same two control variables but with the
asylum granted measure rather than the accepted applications (figure 3 & figure 4).

Figure 1. Asylum seeker applications accepted per 100,000 over a nation’s GDP per
capita average 2005-2016. Source: Worldbank.org; Eurostat.
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Figure 2. Asylum seeker applications accepted per 100,000 over a nation’s non-native population
from the median years of 2010-2011. Sources: OECD.org; Eurostat.
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Figure 3. Asylum granted per 100,000 over a nation’s GDP per capita average 2005-2016.
Sources: Worldbank.org; Eurostat.
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Figure 4. Asylum granted accepted per 100,000 over a nation’s non-native population from the
median years of 2010-2011. Sources: OECD.org; Eurostat.
The results from both figure 1 and 3 do not add a more clearer understanding of the
asylum seeker crisis with the ethnic and civic dichotomy. However, it seems to complement the
economic paradigm as more economically capable nations will also on average have a higher
asylum seeker generosity. It could be possible to say that the nationalist tendency measure
captures the nuance of each nation better. As discussed previously, nations with larger
economies can afford to take more of the burden of asylum seekers but there is no exact number
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that can capture this. For figure 2 & 4 we do see some significance with the non-native variable
especially in figure 4. This could possibly lead to expanding the cultural paradigm with
nationalism by theorizing that civic nations with whatever size non-native populations are
usually more willing to let in more asylum seeker than that of ethnic ones who prefer not to
increase that population. Although the nationalism variable cannot explain all the variation in
asylum seeker generosity, the inclusion of the variable improves the predictive power of the
economic and cultural paradigms.
The focus now turns to the three ethnic nations that appeared above the regression line
for at least three of the figures - Hungary, Bulgaria, and Austria - to see why these nations do not
fit the improved model. Hungary’s position can be explained because of a processing problem
occurring in the nation. Out of the 282,015 applications they have accepted between the years
2005-2016, Hungary has only processed and reviews 30,655 cases (11%) and their asylum
granting rate of those is only 13% (Eurostat). The major reason for this lag is the dramatic
increase in the acceptance of applications in the years 2014 and 2015.8 If this is accounted for,
Hungary would be no more generous than the average ethnic nation such as the Czech Republic.9
Next, Bulgaria can be explained by the international paradigm. Bulgaria is bordered with Turkey,
which possesses the major route for asylum seekers entering the EU, causing the Dublin
regulations to cause asylum seekers to submit their applications in the nation. The substantial
number of asylum seekers crossing into Bulgaria has become uncontrollable by the border patrol.
This is proved by the construction of their border barrier with Turkey and reported cases of

8
9

Hungary took increase responsibility of asylum seeker movement paths in these years.
This is also explained by Hungary’s low rate of asylum granted.
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vigilante groups from the local population taking border control in their own hands (Dillon and
Vaksberg 2016). It is hard to say without conducting a case study how Bulgaria would look
without this issue. Yet, with it being only slightly above the regression line one could speculate
that it would fall within the norm once accounted for.
This leaves the only ethnic nation above the regression line, Austria, in contention for the
case study. Austria is not an EU border state and holds a surprisingly high 82% completion of
processed applications. This comparable to other generous EU nations such as Sweden at 83%
and Germany at 73%. Furthermore, Austria’s nationalist attitudes has been in the ethnic category
for the duration of the examined time period.10 This means that an ethnic ethos did not emerge
from the asylum seeker crisis. However, this does not mean that it did not heighten over time
during the crisis. With no obvious reasoning for the generosity, Austria is selected as the case
study.
To further understand the surprising generosity of Austria a deep comparison involving
more metrics from the economic and cultural paradigm were conducted. Austria is compared
with its also ethnically labeled neighbor the Czech Republic to see just how much more generous
Austria is compared to a nation that has held their asylum seeker generosity steady low
throughout the asylum seeker crisis showing ethnic nationalism in their immigration policy.11

10
11

This trend has existed since at least 2003.
A variation chart was created showing three years of asylum seeker acceptance.
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Controls for Case to Case Comparison

The literature points to economic and social/cultural variables attributing to immigration
policy and therefore the application acceptance rate of a nation. The push-pull theory of
immigration helps with understanding why these array of variables were selected, with all of
them pertaining to the pull concept. When speaking of economics, a country’s overall economic
output is plausibly a great indicator of the immigration it can handle. Overall GDP will be stated
as a monetary value in US dollars. The GDP per capita in dollars will also be used to capture the
individual country’s economic performance. Nations with high overall GDPs should result in
higher rates of accepted application review. The GDP per capita variables will work in the same
way and may enhance the overall GDP variable, as nations with high GDPs but low GDPs per
capita would not be as telling to accept as many asylum seekers as a nation with both high
overall GDP and GDP per capita. Other economic variables outlined are a country’s economic
equality and health. The Gini coefficient was collected for each country to examine the income
inequality and wealth distribution of a nation. A nation that is more economically equal tends to
provide social benefits to its citizens which is attractive to an asylum seeker and most nations
who score high on this have been shown to be more generous in terms of their acceptance rates.
For example, the Nordic nations fit this interpretation (Pratt 2008). The last variable outlined will
be the human development index (HDI), which is a measurement that captures economic and
cultural aspects of a society to create a measurement on the nation’s overall development. The
higher the development as captured by the index the more generous the nation will be with their
application rate. The HDI index is the best variable to capturing the economic and culture
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combined approach that Rustenbach (2010) has used to account for immigration rates. The HDI
takes economic factors such as GDP per capita and complies them with life expectancy and
educational rates to see a nation’s human development.
Coleman outlines that Europe may be using asylum seekers to increase their deflating
population rates (2005). The population growth was employed to show the population growth of
a country per year with the prediction that countries who suffer from negative rates of growth
will have a higher application rate. A statistic that helps with understanding of a nation’s
openness to immigrants is the non-native population. A nation’s non-native population gives a
broad picture of their immigration policy landscape. Non-native population also lends itself to
chain migration. This term refers to the migrant population establishing communication with
their native nation that causes more immigration from that area. A great example of chain
migration is the formation of Greektown, Chinatown, and Ukrainian Village in the city of
Chicago, and the many stages they go through due to the continued influx of those immigrants.
Another measure that will be used to conceptualize the dependent variable listed is total
population. Nations with larger populations would experience less of an impact taking in asylum
seekers compared to small ones numerically. This measure will be used to understand how many
asylum seekers applications are accepted for every 100,000 people in that country. This per
100,000 people number is the most commonly used when reports about asylum seeker
acceptance rates.
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Comparing Austria (ethnic) and the Czech Republic (ethnic) from 2005 Through 2016

There are geographical and political justifications for selection of these countries - both
are located in Central Europe. In 2008, Czech minister of foreign affairs Karel Schwarzenberg
and Jiri Grusa, who has acted as Czech ambassador and Director of the Diplomatic Academy in
Vienna, shared the opinion that Austrians and Czechs are of different language, but of “the same
nation”, the same character (Falter 2008). Weiss used the two nations in a comparative study to
understand nationalist tendency which is very fitting given the research being conducted here
(2003).
Economic comparison•

Austria’s GDP (2005, 2016) ranged from $314.649 billion- $386.428 billion. While the
Czech Republic’s GDP ranged from $135.99 billion- $192.925 billion.

•

GDP per capita shows the same difference as in overall GDP with Austria having a little
over double then that of the Czech Republic. Austria carries a GDP per capita in 2005 of
$40,635 and in 2016 was $44,676. With the three years in between showing around
$51,000. The Czech Republic’s GDP per capita in 2005 was $13,346 and in 2016 rose to
$18,491 with two years surpassing the $20,000 mark.

•

In the Human Development Index category both countries mirror each other as Austria
and The Czech Republic start with middle 800’s in 2005 and both rise to the very high
800’s by the year 2016.
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•

Austria and The Czech Republic both have reported the same income equality with only a
few points variance in the 200’s each year.

Demographics comparison•

Austria’s population has ranged from 8.2 million and increased to 8.5 million, while the
Czech Republic has gone from 10.2 million to 10.5 million.

•

The non-native population in Austria in the past decade has grown from 14%-18% while
over the same time period the Czech Republic went from 5-7%. This obviously points to
Austria having a more diverse society that can cause chain migration, or just be more
welcoming of asylum seekers. However, a review shows that most immigrants in Austria
are from other EU countries meaning that Austria is not necessarily more open to
accepting asylum seekers from 3rd world regions such as Africa and Asia compared to
that of the Czech Republic (Garner 2007, 84; Austrian Embassy Washington 2017). This
also means that Austria’s place on the non-native population graph is more conservative
than portrayed, making it even more of an outlier.

•

Population growth is positive in both countries with it being a little higher in Austria.
This standard growth occurring has caused the two nations to have a two-million-person
population difference throughout the years.

•

Austria grants asylum to 43% of all reviewed applications compared to the Czech
Republic’s 20% rate. Austria falls behind in applications waiting to be reviewed as they
have only reviewed 82% with 45,500 applications left to review (Eurostat). The Czech
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•

Republic seems to be the most well caught up nation with 99.9% of applications decided
on and is the only EU nations that is not behind on their reviewing.

Asylum Seeker Application Rate Difference

When these variables are taken into account the major difference between these two
nations is that Austria is an economically superior nation. Austria possesses an economy that
is twice the size of the Czech Republic, and a much higher GDP per capita. This economic
superiority, however, does not explain why Austria has accepted 255,515 applications to
review compared to The Czech Republic’s 17,880 over the course of the crisis. Austria will
accept over 14 times more applications and grant asylum to 24 times more of those
applications than the Czech Republic. This is the case even though Austria is around 20%
behind in reviewing applications they have accepted compared to The Czech Republic’s
99.9% completion rate.

CHAPTER 9
CASE STUDY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
A quick but informative examination of the Czech Republic’s immigration stance
throughout the crisis will be discussed to show a well selected case of how ethnic nationalism
factors into asylum seeker generosity. What is investigated is a nation that holds ethnic
nationalism to a high enough degree that it is displayed in their voting patterns. Once
immigration become a problem or in this case ‘perceived’ as one, the nation will gravitate to the
party who hold an anti-immigrant stance. Overall, the generosity of the nation should then
decline as a result.
The story of immigration in the Czech Republic starts before it splits with Slovakia in
1993. Czechoslovakia as was Austria forms after the fall of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The
Czech part of Czechoslovakia saw its immigration policy mirror the economic paradigm
combined with the institutional-communist paradigm. The nation’s major immigrant groups
arrived from other communist nations to which they had labor agreements with. The two notable
groups being the Vietnamese and Ukrainians (Janka 2011). When the Czech Republic formed as
its own independent state, ties with Vietnam ended and only limited immigrants from Eastern
Europe such as Russians and Ukrainians came. Overall, Czechoslovakia saw more emigration
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than immigration in its history as for example the refugee’s created from the Prague Spring
incident.
After a little over a decade from independence, the Czech Republic joined the EU in 2004
carrying an immigrant population close to a quarter of a million with the majority from when it
was Czechoslovakia. Because the Czech Republic was a new nation its immigration policy to
this day is still trying to be figured out. This alludes to why half of the people in the Czech
Republic felt as if immigration policy should be made jointly with the EU as demonstrated by
figure 10. Also, during this period the people were asked what their biggest concerns were facing
their nation. As figure 11 displays, only 4% of the nation felt that immigration was one of those
problems.

Figure 10. Czech Republic’s public opinion on who should decide the refugee immigration
policy in 2004. Source: Eurobarometer.
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Figure 11. Czech Republic’s public opinion on most important nation problems 05/2005. Source:
Eurobarometer.
The Czech Republic during the duration of the time series only accepted 17,880
applications, processing 99.9% of them, and granting asylum to only 3,685 seekers. This
averages out to about 307 seekers granted asylum a year in a nation that has over ten million
people. To add to this the Czech Republic favored applications from seekers of nations in
Eastern Europe (Russia & Ukraine) compared to those of the Middle-East and Africa. While
nations such as Austria and the rest of Europe’s people’s worries rose about immigration, the
Czech Republic’s population still stood percentage wise in the single digits throughout the
2000’s.12 This is the case because the Czech Republic was not taking in a meaningful amount of
asylum seekers. Because of this, the population felt no need to worry and therefore increase

12

Single digits refer to public opinion on what is (select nations) biggest problem facing the nation.
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generosity to the EU. What is even more interesting however is that the longer the crisis
prolonged the less the Czech Republic contributed.

Political Parties in the Czech Republic, what do they have to say?

Similar to Austria, the Czech Republic has three major parties in their parliamentary
system throughout the crisis. The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), the Civic Democratic
Party (ODS), and the ANO 2011 (ANO) who was only recently founded in 2012 but in the 2017
election collected a stunning 78/200 seat in parliament being the only political party other than
the CSSD and the ODS to lead an election since 1990. In terms of immigration policy, the Czech
Republic’s political parties are unfamiliar with it, this is due to the transformation that sees a
nation suffering from emigration to now having to acknowledge the potential immigration that
could occur from the asylum seeker crisis. The CSSD carries a pro-EU approach to immigration
and in 2006 took a pro-immigration stance with providing fair access to education, social
support, and help to assimilate into Czech culture. However, over time they have retracted/not
followed through from their openness stance as when they win elections and form coalition
governments, the asylum seeker generosity does not increase in the nation (“Czech Social
Democratic Party”). The ODS takes a more stricter position on immigration holding a national
conservatism view and believes immigration should only be allowed if it directly benefits the
Czech Republic in more or less an economic sense (“Civic Democratic Party”). The ANO party
whose founder Andrej Babiš claims should be seen more as a political movement rather than a
party takes an interesting approach to immigrants. His immigration policy can be summed up in
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one of his quotes from 2016, “After what has been happening in Europe, I say clearly that I don’t
want even a single refugee in the Czech Republic, not even temporarily,” (Muller 2016). It
cannot be certainly said that Babiš was always opposed to asylum seekers but rather that he does
not want the EU telling his nation how to handle the crisis. However, due to the Czech
Republic’s low acceptance of applications and low rate of granting asylum, he most likely would
like to keep things the way they are. The key word in his statement was ‘temporarily’ referring to
the idea that even accepting applications in which harbors the asylum seeker is too much for him.
This explains their 99.9% application processing rate as the nation does not want to hold
undecided asylum seekers for the EU to sort out.

The Czech Republic’s Fear of Asylum Seekers they do not see

In Austria we will see the nation awaken their ethnic nationalist tendency because of the
presents and amount of asylum seekers in their nation. In the Czech Republic, this ethnic
awaking also arises however it is from the asylum seeker presents in Europe. The Czech
Republic as of 2016 holds 3,685 asylum seekers with the majority of them from Eastern Europe.
However, the resentment of the population towards asylum seekers is significant. Figure 11
displays that 47% of Czechs believe that immigration is one of the two biggest problems in their
nation. This figure is surprising taking into account that the refugee population makes up only
0.0003% of the population (Eurostat).
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Figure 11. Czech Republic’s public opinion on most important nation problems 11/2015. Source:
Eurobarometer.

This begs the question of why the population is so worried about asylum seekers that they
do not encounter. Researcher Sides and Citrin probably give the best explanation to this as they
believe negative attitudes spring from threatened identity from over estimations of the immigrant
population (2007). This leaves another question over how the Czech Republic felt this
threatening with such as small asylum seeker population. This is where the rise of the ANO party
and immigration negativity go hand in hand.
The ANO party’s Andrej Babiš is the second wealthiest man in the Czech Republic and
owns a majority of the media in the nation. His party’s platform is a populist movement to
reform the nation in areas such as, EU integration, corruption, and unemployment. The ANO 11
party is deeply complex to explain in this research although how it got the public to react to
immigration is not. The 2013 and 2017 elections saw immigration take the central fold of Czech
politics. The media in the Czech Republic ran stories and headlines as shown, “Wave of 200,000
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refugees about to roll over Czech Republic” and that all asylum seekers are “economic
refugee” (Jurečková 2016). Corcoran as discussed in the literature review wrote how political
figures such as Babiš use media as a tool to energize the public into believing that asylum
seekers in this case, are a real threat to the cultural community of the Czech Republic (2011).
The media has been very effective at swaying public opinion in the Czech Republic as it has
carried the notion that asylum seekers have ruined Europe and the Czech Republic is next.
Because the asylum seeker population is so low in the Czech Republic, it makes sense for
politicians to use the EU as the example of a culture under threat to get the Czech population
riled up. What cannot be stated for certain is if Babiš appealed to the Czech Republic’s ethnic
nationalism for his self-benefit or because he is concerned about Czech culture. What is for
certain however, is that the Czech Republic takes the least generous stance when concerning
asylum seekers. For example, the Czech Republic was one of the original nations to reject the
relocation of asylum seekers from Hungary, Greece, and Italy that required the Czech Republic
to take in a mere 1,591 refugees.
To bring this full circle we can look at the comments made by Czech President Miloš
Zeman on the arrival of asylum seekers from the Middle-East, “Not all Muslims are terrorists,
but all terrorists are Muslims”, and his comment that the refugee crisis is “an invasion organized
by the Muslim Brotherhood” (Jureckova 2016). In the Czech Republic we see ethnic nationalism
favoring separate groups closer to their people (Gans 1998; Garner2007). As Russians and
Ukraine have been more welcomed in the nation throughout its immigration history. We also see
ethnic nationalism quickly spread throughout the masses as the media has propagated a narrative
that concludes asylum seekers in even the continent of Europe are a menace to the Czech
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Republic. Even though the Czech Republic is a new nation trying to figure out its immigration
policy, the EU immigration policy will be resisted at all costs. This is supported by the quick rise
in public opinion from not being concerned about asylum seekers to asylum seekers being the
biggest problem in the nation by far.

CHAPTER 10
CASE STUDY AUSTRIA

In this case study we will examine the reasoning behind why Austria has accepted a
substantial amount of asylum seekers even though it is an ethnic nationalist nation. Because
nationalism in this research is decided from the opinions of the people, there will be a focus on
how the political parties of Austria handled the crisis while also looking at their stances towards
asylum seekers throughout the years. Situations of, anti-immigrant party support, favoritism of
certain asylum seekers, and EU cooperate will also be looked at to see potential causes for
generosity.

Modern Immigration History

Austria formed as an independent state in 1919 after the First World War. In less than
two decades of their independence Austria saw the Anschluss of 1938 occur making it an
annexed state of Nazi Germany. After the Second World War Austria’s male workforce was
devastated from severe casualties. This was complimented with the mass movement of people
after the war seeing 500,000 displaced people permanently settling in Austria, the majority of
them ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe (Jandl Kraler 2003). In the 1960’s after some national
retrieval from the Second World War, Austria starts their first modern-day immigration policy of
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the German Gastarbeiter program or “guest workers.” This immigration policy falls directly
under the economic paradigm discussed earlier as Austria had a huge demand for labor, without
giving guest workers actual citizenship. Examples of these temporary worker deals were
agreements signed with Turkey (1964) and Yugoslavia (1966). By the year 1973, the number of
guest workers from these two nations combined reached 227,000. However, economic
turbulence in the 70’s and 80’s saw Austria halt the migration of temporary workers that by
1985, saw the number halved to 113,500 Turkish and Yugoslav workers in Austria. Since the
Second World War to 1990 Austria has shown a direct correlation between labor needs and how
they form immigration policy.
During the Cold War, Austria was in a unique geo-political position as it was on the
opposite side of the Soviet influence sphere of the Iron Curtain but not part of NATO.13 During
this period Austria saw three asylum seeker/refugee events directly effecting the nation. First in
1956, with 180,000 Hungarian refugees being the first refugees after the Second World War to
enter Austria. Austria even though taking in the 180,000 for a time, only granted asylum to 11%
of them. Next, the "Prague Spring" of 1968, where about 162,000 Czechoslovakians entered
Austria, with the majority later traveling on to other Western European states due to Austria’s
low asylum granting rate (Jandl and Kraler 2003). Last, in 1981 and 1982 were 150,000 Polish
asylum seekers flooded into Austria. In order to mitigate the event, Austria installed a visa
requirement making less than 30,000 of them able to apply for asylum. In all three cases we see
Austria’s willingness to accept refugees and asylum seekers not to be strong as it carried an

13

NATO is the- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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immigration policy that can be describes as “just enough” in a sense of helping the European
community with migrant crises while taking in number that can be absorbed in their labor force.

The Appearance of Asylum Seeker Laws

The 1990’s saw Austria’s immigration policy question its economic and “just enough”
approach to the migrant crises. The late 80’s economic boom saw a demand in immigrant labor
in Austria. This was complimented with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the breaking up of
Yugoslavia. These mixtures of events saw 690,000 foreigners in 1993 making up 9.1% of the
employed work force. During this time Larsen’s research on nationalist tendency does indicate
that it was an ethnic state (2016). What supports this statement is the rise of the Freedom Party
(FPÖ) who saw a rise in popularity in 1994 by earning 42/183 seats in parliament and eventually
winning a junior partnership with the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) in both the 1999 and 2002
elections. The rise of the FPÖ in the Austrian political realm saw multiple laws being passed to
tighten asylum seeker immigration in the nation both before and after their wins in parliament.
To list a few for example, Aliens Act 1997, Asylum Act 1997, The principle “integration before
citizenship” introduced into the 1998 amendment of the Citizenship Act, the amendment of the
Aliens Act and the Asylum Act, which came into force on the 1 January 2003, Aliens Law
Package 2005, Aliens Police Act 2005, Settlement and Residence Act. These acts covered the
assimilation of foreigners in the nation, prevented more asylum seekers from entering, and
established systems to decide asylum applications quickly to create one of the strictest
immigration policies in all of Europe for asylum seekers. However, this was only limited to
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asylum seekers and did not pertain to other EU nationals migrating to Austria as that would
conflict with Austria’s entering of the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994 (Jandl Kraler
2003). The most prevenient of these policies was the new Naturalization Act passed in 1998
allowing immigrants to apply for naturalization after living in the nation for at least 10 years and
proving they were able to economically care for themselves. This policy combined with
deportations got Austria’s asylum seeker population of granted asylum from almost 90,000 in
1996 to around 15,492 by the year 2000 (“Macondo - Refuge in Austria” 2006) (The World
Bank).14 Figure 5 below displays a line graph showing the sharp dip in the refugee population
due to naturalization and mainly deportation.

Figure 5. Austria’s refugee and Asylum seeker population from 1990-2016. Source: UNHCR.

Even though Austria’s asylum seeker laws were strict, it could not prevent asylum
sending situations from occurring in Central Europe. The late 90’s saw refugees flood into

14

It is hard to measure how many refugees became naturalized because of complications in the law to which some
refugees were held to different standards.
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Austria from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, and Macedonia. Due to pressures from other EU
states, Austria accepted seekers from these nations to prevent mass movement of them to
Western Europe (Ardittis 1994, 167-168). Tens of thousands of seekers were granted asylum and
Austria initiated a phase in management of asylum seekers with added prevention to minimize
how many cross over. As the National Contact Point Austria in the European Migration Network
research put it, Austria from the late 1990’s to 2015 “attempted to manage migration more
efficiently through creating several “channels of immigration”, new advisory bodies, targeted
legislation and major administrative restructuring,” Stopping the striking of prevention of
migrant law that occurs in the 1990’s.” This quote points to the idea that Austria learned from its
migrant dealings in the 1990’s and wanted to try a difference approach more favorable to
Europe. This change of immigration ideology begun with the fall of the FPÖ.

FPÖ and its Relation to Ethnic Nationalism

In the year 2000 during the FPÖ stint in Austria, the EU implemented diplomatic
sanctions against the nation. The popular but controversial figure Jörg Haider who was Chairman
of the FPÖ seemed to have created the conflict with his troubling right-wing ideology approach
to gaining power that was of concern to the EU. Even though the EU sanctions were more
symbolic than practical, it can be safe to state that the FPÖ and EU do not have a good
relationship. The FPÖ opposed the immigration policies that the EU implemented in the 1990’s
(Schwarz 2000) (Freeman 2002).
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The FPÖ’s popularity can be seen as a great measure to test and understand the ethnic
nationalism in Austria. The FPÖ throughout its tenure in politics has always represented the
xenophobic, nationalism, and national conservatism that are all key elements to the cultural
community that ethnic nationalism is based on (Freeman 2002, 116) (Wolfram 2017). The
people in Austria may harbor these feelings and once one of these key traits are threated then it
can cause an awaking that is shown by increased votes to the party who has constantly supported
these values. As will be displayed in this case study, the FPÖ victories in parliament only occur
when refugee and asylum seeker populations are high. The case can also be that a portion of
Austrians hold a neutral stance in their nationalism allowing more immigration, but their
threshold to keep this is very limited and once the situation seems to their viewpoint as optimistic
at best, they then turn to their ethnic nationalism to control the situation.

The Asylum Seeker Crisis and Transfer of Power

Due to strict asylum seeker laws that were effective in decreasing the refugee population,
the population of Austria did not see immigration as a national problem during the starting point
of this research. As shown in figure 6 from Eurobarometer, around 16% percent of Austrians
would consider the migrant situation in 2005 to be one of the two biggest problems their nation
is facing. Also, worth pointing out is that Austrians biggest fears by far were unemployment
fostering the population to be even more anti-immigration because of its previous economic
paradigm approach. To compliment this Austrians before the establishment of the CEAS were
more in favor of their nation having control of immigration policy rather than having a joint EU
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policy as figure 7 displays. This low concern for immigration but strong feeling of wanting to
control their own immigration policy displays the concerns seen in the 1990’s that had EU
nations made aware that new EU member Austria, would have to take the burden of accepting
asylum seekers because of their central location in Europe (Ardittis 1994, 167-168). In short,
Austria entered the new asylum seeker crisis wanting to control its own borders but willing to
cooperate with EU standards.

Figure 6. Austria’s public opinion on most important nation problems 05/2005. Source:
Eurobarometer
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Figure 7. Austria’s public opinion on who should decide the refugee immigration policy in 2004.
Source: Eurobarometer

In 2006, The SPÖ and ÖVP parties formed a grand coalition to administrate Austria. The
quick fall of the FPÖ resulted in major setbacks and failures to govern the nation in sectors such
as local administration and economic affairs due to a lack of experience in government (Luther
2007). The new grand coalition’s stance on immigration can be displayed in comments made by
the Chancellor of Austria, Werner Faymann (SPÖ 2008 –2016) who insisted with Angela Merkal
that the ‘open-border policy’ of letting asylum seekers enter the EU with no substantial measures
on their borders would in fact work (“Austrian leaders rethink open door policy for refugees”
2016). One might ask why Austria’s Chancellor would be fine with the entry of asylum seekers
into a nation that had just one of the strictest immigration policies. The best evidence to
understand this is that SPÖ who Faymann was the chairman of is pro-Europeanism. This means
it seeks EU approval as it wants to expand the institutional powers of the EU because of the
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perceived benefits from being a member (Notermans 2001, 203). For example, to push EU
legislative power to eventually make Europe into a federalist union. Someone who is skeptical of
giving the EU more legislative power and believes that their nation may be suffering from the
institution is considered a euro-skeptic as many anti-immigrant parties in Europe will be as they
push back against the institutional paradigm of immigration.
Due to the grand coalition’s approach on the ‘open door policy’ the arrival of asylum
seekers starts to significantly increase from year to year. During this time period, asylum seeker
laws focused on the processing portion of the crisis and asylum seekers who showed up to
Austria’s borders were accepted with minimal issues or complications. This period that lasts for
a decade explains why Austria was generous in their granted asylum and accepted application
rates. Another factor was Austrian refugee facilities left over from the refugee crises in the 20th
century. Camps like Traiskirchen could accommodate thousands of asylum seekers without the
mass public noticing anything. This could explain why the ethnic awaking in Austria was
perhaps delayed and why the EU expected Austria to take in so much.

Asylum Seekers Quotas in Austrian States

What is unique about the asylum seeker crisis is its time span. As many asylum seeker
situations happen with one flow, the current one has a constant pace of arriving seekers. Due to
this, Austria established asylum seeker quotas for its nine states. These quotes were established
in 2012 and were calculated by the state’s total population, existing asylum seeker population,
and facilities to house refugees. With the harboring of asylum seekers, the state is responsible for
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40% of the financial need of each seeker.15 Even though all states agree to this notion only two
out of the nine met their quotas with the state Vienna picking up 139.9% of its quota in 2014 to
make up for it (“Five states fail to fulfill asylum quota” 2014).16 States negligence to attend to
their asylum seeker quotas is alarming. As 2014 was before the mass surge of seekers entering
the EU in 2015 and 2016.
Vienna seems to display a generosity beyond the rest of Austria because it has a history
with asylum seekers as it was the city to harbor most of them throughout the 20th century (Barber
2016). The diversity of Vienna however stretches far beyond the 20th century as it was the
administrative capital of the Austria-Hungary that was a multi-ethnic state that saw a blending of
its ethnicities in the city of Vienna. In present, Vienna’s population bolsters a 50% migration
background (“Facts and figures on Migration 2017 - Viennese population”).17 This fact points to
the independent variable not accurately capturing the Viennese tendency on nationalism. This is
due to the survey data taking responses from pure Austrians as the ISSP data only takes
responses from people whose parents where both born in the nation. One caveat because of this
is that even though Austria is believed to be an ethnic state, the people of Vienna could have a
more potent city culture to which would carry a more civic view of nationalism and therefore be
so willing to take beyond their quota in asylum seekers.
As outlined before, only two states reached their quotas. An examination was made to see
if states that neglected their asylum seeker quotas did in fact favor the FPÖ party whose rise to

15

The federal government would finance the other 60%.
Keep in mind Vienna holds almost 25% of the nation’s population and had the largest asylum seeker population.
17
This is measure by at least having one parent who was born abroad.
16
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reelection in 2017 could have begun in these states. In 2014, Vienna and lower Austria were the
two states who excessed their quota. The states of Burgenland and Carinthia got to around 88%
and the states of, Upper Austria, Styria, Tyrol, Salzburg, Vorarlberg were lower (“Five states fail
to fulfill asylum quota” 2014). A skip to the year 2016 when the quota was last updated sees that
only two states made their quota, Vienna and Voralberg and worse in 2017, only Vienna made its
quota picking up the slack for every other state (Asylum Information Database). Table 5 below
will display the vote share of each state from the 2013 and 2017 election’s four major parties.
This will then average into one percentage. The states highlighted in yellow signify that they are
one of the five most lagging states in their quotas since the year it was established.
Table 5. Party vote per state, averaged total from 2013 & 2017 election. Source:
Nationalratswahl 2013 & 2017
Burgenland
Carinthia
Lower
Austria
Upper
Austria
Salzburg
Styria
Tyrol
Vorarlberg
Vienna

SPO
OVP
FPO
Greens
35.05% 29.80% 21.30% 4.40%
30.85% 29.60% 24.85% 7.10%
26.20% 33.10% 22.35%
27.40%
22.90%
24.45%
19.55%
15.45%
33.05%

28.45%
32.20%
26.20%
35.35%
30.50%
18.05%

6.15%

24.10% 7.95%
22.80% 9.40%
26.70% 6.70%
22.15% 9.85%
22.30% 12.10%
20.65% 11.15%

Clearly voter ideology is well spread throughout Austria and no argument can be made
that the states who failed their quotas had a significant lean towards the FPÖ. One line of
thinking suggests that the nation as a whole is equally feeling the effects of the crisis due to the
proposed equal spreading of asylum seekers. Another avenue sees the OVP in the 2017 as also
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the anti-immigrant party as their chairman Sebastian Kurz has been in agreeance with the FPÖ
on immigration (Schultheis 2017). Plus, the SPO has also changed their tone on immigration
favoring strict immigration reform however not to the extent of the two other parties. This means
that a vote for the OVP, FPÖ, and SPO in the 2017 election meant the same choice in terms of
stricter immigration policy.

The Presents of Ethnic Nationalism

The year 2015 broke records for the amount of asylum seekers entering into the EU.
1,257,030 first time applications were filed causing a turning point for many EU nations on
immigration policy (Eurostat). Austria perhaps took the biggest 180 degrees turn as the nation
displayed drastic measures. Austria took in the brunt amount of applications totaling at 88,160
being its highest ever in the current crisis with the 2nd most year being less than half that.
However, the EU demanded more of Austria who can be best described as having enough of the
institutional paradigm approach towards the asylum seeker crisis. In 2015, the EU established a
mandatory quota system giving each nation a certain amount of asylum seekers to accept.
Austria at first was compliant, but once it realized that many of its neighboring EU nation were
not taking any and even suing the EU for telling them to do. Austria eventually followed suit and
was the next nation in line to begin to employee major anti-asylum seeker measures showing
ethnic nationalism springing and a neglect towards EU policy.18 The EU pressed them on their
tightening of immigration policy to which Chancellor of Austria Werner Faymann said "Austria

18

The nations to reject the quota outright were: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
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cannot be accused of not showing solidarity after it took 90,000 refugees in the previous year."
Showing a disagreement on the extent of how much help Austria should provide.
During this time the grand coalition was still in charge but weaker as it lost nine seats in
the 2013 election. What was different was the coalition’s position on the asylum seeker crisis.
The Chancellor of Austria Werner Faymann who at one point support the ‘open door policy’.
Saw himself now calling it the ““wait-and-see” approach” referring to its overly optimistic view
and tried to press the EU on their weak attempt to combat unemployment occurring in Austria
(“Austrian chancellor says Merkel's economic policy too timid – Kurier” 2015). During the peak
years of the crisis none of the three major parties were trying to push for any legislative that
favored asylum seeker generosity. This was a result of the FPÖ gaining a sizeable number of
seats in 2013 from pushing anti-immigration rhetoric that other parties then followed suit in
order to appeal to the majority in the 2017 elections.
To further explore 2015, Austria began by stopping the processing of asylum seeker
applications. This was an attempt to slow the amount of asylum seekers entering the nation. As
the interior minister of Austria, Johanna Mikl-Leitner stated that “Austria is a target nation for
asylum seekers to be spent because it is among the fastest EU member states in handling asylum
requests….” (Hall 2015). This explained why Austria’s processing rate is 82% for a nation
whose majority of asylum laws in the past decade focused on the processing portion. To add to
this measure, Austria in late 2015 constructed a border barrier covering both the Italy and
Slovenia borders. In late 2016, another plan still being deliberated is an expansion to the border
wall to the cover the Hungarian portion (“Austria lays groundwork for Hungarian border fence”
2016). The reasoning for the border barrier is to control the direct flow of how many asylum
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seekers can step foot in Austria to then claim asylum. This displays Austria wanting control of its
immigration policy as other EU nations have had throughout the crisis. To capture EU
immigration policy resentment, we test to see how the people of Austria have felt over the
duration of the crisis. In 2005, around 18% of Austrians thought immigration was one of the two
biggest problems. During the height of the crisis in 2015 the same question was asked to the
Austrian people. As figure 8 displays immigration has now become the biggest issue in the
nation with 56% of the public believing that it is one of the two biggest problems facing the
nation.

Figure 8. Austria’s public opinion on most important nation problems 11/2015. Source:
Eurobarometer.
The Austrian populist obvious panicked at the mass influx of asylum seekers began to
support the anti-immigrant FPÖ party as they did in the 1990’s when immigration was an issue.
It is also worth mentioning that once the refugee population of Austria reaches an around 90,000

74

refugee population, the FPÖ finds itself back at the helm of their government. Before the FPÖ’s
coalition victory in 2017, the last legislation passed was the proposed asylum seeker cap. This
cap involved a maximum of 80 application to be accepted a day no matter the circumstance. This
went directly against what the EU commanded in their asylum seeker quota (“Migrant crisis:
Austria asylum cap begins despite EU anger” 2016).

Things get even Stricter under the FPÖ

One of the first immigration policies the right leaning coalition of the FPÖ and OVP
created was the requirement for asylum seekers to hand over cash and cell-phone to even apply
for an application and plans to quickly deport asylum seekers right after rejection (Young-Powell
2017). At this time the EU court ruled in favor of Austria being able to deport asylum seekers
who crossed into an EU nation first because of the Dublin regulations. Because Austria is within
the EU open border zone, this gives them the legal right to potentially deport all asylum seekers
in their nation (Bell 2017). The new coalition’s stance on immigration is to prevent it from
further happening while trying to minimize the refugee population as it did in the late 1990’s.
Austria is the only nation that makes asylum seekers hand over material possession and further
plans to tighten asylum migration to occur are of frequent deliberation in the nation.
Due to the record amount of asylum seekers arriving in Europe in 2015, the EU
established a relocation program to help take 160,000 asylum seekers from Italy, Greece, and
Hungary to lift the burden off them. Austria was exempt from any part of the relocation program
till March 17, 2017. When asked about this in early March 2017 Austria's socialist-democratic
chancellor, Christian Kern stated "We believe an (further) exception is necessary for Austria for
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having already fulfilled its obligation. We will discuss that with the European
Commission" (Nielsen 2017). What is shocking about this is that the OVP were pro-EU and even
after the 2017 election still took an anti-EU stance in the immigration debate. The EU’s response
to Austria’s delaying in the relocation plan is that it is considered ‘illegal’ to back out.
Lastly, to state that Austria’s whole population has had a national ethnic awaking is far
beyond the truth. Even during the height of the crisis in 2015, 31% of Austrians still had a
favorable few of immigrants from outside of the EU, as displayed in figure 9. This significant
positive view stems from the idea that Austria’s ethnic nationalism is at this point limited. What
seems to be happening is because Austria is a democracy, once a majority of the people feel as if
immigration is getting out of hand, all parties will push for immigration reform in order to secure
the vote. What is worth pointing out is the popularity of the new coalition is still rising and the
asylum seeker arrivals for the year 2017 are still very high comparatively to the whole crisis.
What is still left to be determined is if the ethnic nationalist rose in Austria was because of a
perceived threatening of Austrian culture or their issues with the EU telling them how to manage
their borders. Also, to what extent will Austria keep the FPÖ in power as now they enter the
government with more experience than their previous partnership in 1999.
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Figure 9. Austria’s public opinion on non-EU migration into Austria. Source: Eurobarometer.

Weiss’s research on Austria can help explain the portion of Austrians that have not
displayed ethnic nationalist tendencies through the economic paradigm. Weiss compares
nationalism in central European countries of interest to Europe’s asylum seeker crisis. He defines
nationalism in the new school of thought that disagrees with the traditional notion that ethnicnationalism is grown from failed capitalist states. His reasoning for this is that many modern day
right-wing parties are attached to the notion of the free market (2003, 381-382). The research
involved the use of survey data as did this research to capture attitudes towards; democracy, free
markets, tolerance, and social status. After conducting the test, the standing traditional theory
that ethnic nationalism stems from economic hardship is still somewhat prevalent. The nation
that counters this finding is Austria, which is the longest and strongest democracy out of the five
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nations tested. It seems that Austria’s population carries less ethnic-nationalist thoughts than its
other Central European counterparts because of its better economic condition. However, a decent
majority of the population can still display attitudes associated with ethnic nationalism (2003).
If some of the generosity can be explained by economics what does that mean for
Austria’s high non-native population. As displayed in the comparison, Austria’s non-native
population comes from that of other EU nations who migrated there since the 1990’s. Austria has
been quite supportive of migration from other EU states as during the crisis, 60% of Austrian’s
believed inter EU immigration was a positive thing for the nation (Eurobarometer). If Austria’s
non-native population was a majority from outside the EU it is believed that their generosity of
asylum seekers would be higher. Therefore higher non-native populations does mean generosity
towards immigrants but it certain immigrants are favored in the case of Austria.
What can be concluded is that Austrians find inter-EU migration as productive for their
nation while the arrival of asylum seekers from around the world can be viewed generally
negatively. What seems to be the mystery for Austria is why they allow asylum seekers in the
first place. It seems that Austrian politicians at the time of the crisis allowed asylum seekers to
come in order to appease the EU, this might seem counterproductive however as they did this in
the 1990’s and it resulted in the rise of the Freedom Party. But as in both cases Austria was
placed in the geo-political location that forced them to accept asylum seekers. This holds true
even though Austria is well within the Schengen Agreement as the Dublin regulations in the
current crisis were neglected. This lends itself to why Austria erected the border wall in the south
(“Austria to build fence on Slovenia border” 2015).

CHAPTER 11
DISCUSSION

Ethnic nationalism as a measure of explaining asylum seeker generosity has proven
effective in this research. It seems that once nations are pressed by institutions or political
situations, the people of that nation will start to question these entities and cling to a
primordialist view of nationalism. This view point indices people to believe something inherit
about their identity and the land they possess to which favors themselves over any migrant in
crisis. Where this research sees its limitations is not being able to further expand on the
economic paradigm which drove many of these nation’s immigration policy before the current
migrant crisis. Also, to what circumstances causes the variation to which ethnic nationalism is
displayed. As for example, if 100 million asylum seekers showed up to Europe would any EU
nation show generosity towards them? This perceived threshold and economic paradigm can be
further examined to see the nuance of the situation.
Austria and the Czech Republic show two cases of ethnic nationalism coming to grips
with the European Union that H2b theorized would be the cause for an ethnic nation. What is
very interesting and worth more exploring is that the Czech Republic wanted to cooperate with
the EU in 2005 but quickly revoked this notion once they were expected to contribute. This is
compared to Austria who contributed in taking a substantial number of asylum seekers (as it was
one of those most generous nations) till the point where the Austrian people felt the need to have
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control of their own immigration policy. Another key note of interest is the relationship
immigration has as a mechanism to awaken ethnic nationalism in nations that hold a certain
amount. For example, it would be hard to see the presents of ethnic nationalism in a place like
the Czech Republic until their cultural community is threatened by the perceived asylum seeker
arrivals. The Czech Republic watched though the window into the rest of the EU to which it saw
ineffectively manage the migrant crisis. Elites such as Babiš and Schwarzenberg cling on to this
idea to which saw the rise of political movements like ANO 11. TOP 09, and the Czech Pirate
Party who tried to bring new life into the Czech Republic’s political system. However, ANO 11
swept the nation as it appealed to multiple reasons that this research did not cover but important
to this research, an Euro-skeptic view.
To discuss the other hypotheses laid out, we see the theory of a loose immigration policy
to be the exact oppose of the truth (H2c). Austria had strict asylum seeker policies in the 90’s
that afterwards was less enforced. As for the movement problem, it does seem to be a major
factor as it decides the number of asylum seekers entering Europe. To which the EU carried an
expectation from Austria to taken in a certain amount (H2a). If the crisis only consisted of
100,000 applications being received a year, we would not see this awaking of ethnic nationalism
in Austria as its share of applications would not be high enough. In turn, the international
paradigm can help indicated a nations threshold. In Austria it seems that the threshold is a
refugee population of around 90,000. As for our main explanatory hypothesis of appealing to the
EU, a convincing argument can be made that at first Austrian politics favored it but once the
majority of Austrians were alarmed by the number of asylum seekers being received, all major
parties followed.

80

As for the last hypothesis being put fourth that Austrians will express their ethnic
nationalism through the Freedom Party we see correlating results. Once refugee populations
reached the same threshold in both major asylum seeker crises we see Austrians turn to the
Freedom Party. What this research was not able to do is understand why the voting percentage
for the Freedom Party was so well distributed around the nation. Could it simply be that each
state had its own share of passionate ethnic nationalists?

CHAPTER 12
CONCLUSION

After reviewing the outlier case of Austria, we find mix results from the purposed
hypotheses. The current asylum seeker crisis is a historic one. In modern history, nations of the
3rd world have not migrated to nations of the 1st world in the numbers seen. With millions
arriving and seemingly millions yet to come, the future of the EU is at risk. The EU is starting to
lose grip on many of its Eastern nations who have flat out rejected the unity approach towards
the asylum seeker crisis. The Eastern states of the union have a more ethnic view that at the least
plays some part in it. What further research can explore is if these nation’s ethnic nationalism
causes a direct approach as seen by the Czech Republic (flat out rejection) or the delayed
approach by Austria (rejection after threshold). It would be interesting to see an ethnic nation
respond differently than these two cases. However, numerically, more nations than not would see
the Czech approach.
To respond to the overarching question on why some EU nations reject quotas and hold
little generosity towards asylum seekers. It seems to come back to the characteristics of
nationalism and how people view their state. If the state is viewed as a law of the land to which
people must simply respect the institutions set in place such as parliament, Courts, etc. How
people pursue their life after displaying civic respect does not matter. This in turn means
accepting people seeking asylum to your society should not harbor negative feelings. However, a
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state built from a cultural community that has brought people together to believe that who they
are is beyond the evident and in many cases historically linked, the idea of massive amounts of
people who are not of their identity trying to enter their nation, seems very threatening.
To address why Austria allows a certain number of asylum seekers into its nation in the
first place. This research has determined that in both cases the party in charge wanted to
cooperate with the EU because of the favorable view they had with them. Austria has a nonnative population that is higher than that of the USA.19 This means a case can be made that
Austria is welcoming to migrants who are also part of the EU, but when it comes to asylum
seekers, Austria holds a negative view. This is where the Czech Republic and Austria share a
similarity of favoritism towards certain migrants. What is different between the two nations
however, is that Austria was willing to accept asylum seekers because the EU told them to while
the Czech Republic did not succumb to such demands.
As for a prediction on the future of Europe, it seems that the awaking of states being
euro-skeptics seems to have taken a foothold. If the EU continues with their quota system and
asking of nations to contribute amounts they do not perceive fair, more resentment will be
created. However, the EU is stuck, as letting the border nations of Greece and Italy fend for
themselves (as the Dublin regulation would have it) would see chaos ensue in those nations. The
only solution that will not cause more complications to the EU states is the ‘new tools’ approach
by researcher Boswell (2003). This meaning that the EU tackles the issues occurring in the 3rd
world to stop the sending of asylum seekers and ending any international events that cause

19

This statement is taking into account the percentage of the population and not the actual number of non-native
citizens.
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asylum seekers to occur. However, if we believe the reporting that many of the asylum seekers
are simply economically driven, then the ‘new tools’ approach will seem impractical. The only
action that can for sure help us understand the murky details of the crisis is to wait and see what
comes of it.
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